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Abstract: Social media participation undermines individual autonomy in ways that ought to 
concern ethicists. Discussions in the philosophical literature are concerned primarily with 
egregious conduct online such as harassment and shaming, keeping the focus on obvious ills to 
which no one could consent; this prevents a wider understanding of the risks and harms of 
quotidian social media participation. Two particular concerns occupy me; social media 
participation carries the risks of (1) negatively formative experiences and (2) continuous partial 
attention due to our habituation to the variable rewards that social media platforms provide. 
Although social media offers benefits as well as risks, self-knowledge of whether one benefits 
more than one suffers from one’s social media participation is vexed by the very processes 
involved in participating. We are not as free to leave social media as we are to enter. I conclude 
with consideration and rejection of the objections that the ubiquity of the practice indicates 
implied consent to risks, and that users of social media can simply choose not to use such 
communication technologies at all. I argue that we cannot be said to meaningfully consent to 
enter into social media usage, even implicitly, and we do not all have equally easy options to 
avoid the contexts that provide the stimuli of persistent desires.  
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Participation in social media is not an obviously concerning practice for ethicists. It is a 
leisurely pastime for many, a trivial and quotidian thing. Yet social media participation also 
undermines, or seriously risks undermining, individual autonomy in at least two ways. First, the 
consequences of social media participation can include what I call negatively formative 
experiences akin to L. A. Paul’s transformative experiences, the impact of which we cannot 
know in advance and cannot meaningfully consent to in advance.1 One can neither predict 
whether an unexpected influx of negative responses on social media will happen to oneself, nor 
whether the experience of indefinite amounts of negativity will be transformative of one’s mental 
states and future attitudes. When the consequences of one’s negatively formative experiences 
include uncontrollable alterations of one’s preferences in ways that substantially affect one’s life 
choices in ways one would otherwise find undesirable, then one’s autonomy is reduced.  
Second, social media platforms include variable reward mechanisms that render users 
more likely to become habituated to ludic loops of repetitive, reward-seeking behavior, that is, 
staying on or returning to a social media site in order to garner the variable rewards built into the 
platform. James Williams, with others, refers to this as the “slot-machine effect.”2 Reward-
seeking behavior may be habituating to a degree one cannot anticipate and to a degree one would 
not desire. It is an open question as to whether social media is addictive; more importantly for 
my purposes, one can suffer consequences of variable-reward habituation well short of addiction, 
including continuous partial attention, an undesirable change in one’s cognitive capacities that 
further diminishes one’s autonomy.3 Uma Narayan’s minimalist conception of autonomy 
                                                          
1 L. A. Paul, Transformative Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
2 James Williams, Stand out of Our Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018): 35. 
3 The term continuous partial attention was coined by Linda Stone, a consultant and software developer; some 
social scientists have taken up the phrase but tend to refer more often to distraction from multitasking or 
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includes the condition that one is “not subject to literal outright coercion by others,” but when 
variable rewards are a feature built into social media platform design, I hold that one’s autonomy 
is at least undermined by the slot machine effect.4  
One might suggest that any potential user of social media is free to stay offline, just as 
any individual is free to stay out of a casino, and anyone capable of reading can review and 
consent to the terms of agreement available on social network sites (SNS).5 This is partially 
correct; those of us capable of reading can review terms of agreement, and some of us are free to 
avoid ever entering some SNS in the first place. In what follows, I argue that, although users may 
be competent to click the button that accepts the terms and conditions of (for example) Twitter 
insofar as we have the requisite capacities to consent and the available option to choose not to 
enter, in the course of using the SNS our capacities are likely to become undermined by 
engineered ludic loops so that we do not always retain competence to consent in the course of 
performing participation. When that happens, we are not as free to leave social media as we are 
to enter. 
The changes to ordinary lives brought about by social media participation have not gone 
unnoticed by philosophers. However, to date philosophers have focused on moral wrongs to 
which no one can, in principle, consent, including shaming, harassment, abuse, stalking, and 
                                                          
hypernatural monitoring, and the related concepts capture so many of the same related phenomena that I limit 
myself to referring to the loss of focus and distraction with which I’m concerned as continuous partial attention in 
this essay. See Linda Stone, “Continuous Partial Attention,” at The Attention Project on her blog (copyright 2002-
2017, https://lindastone.net/qa/continuous-partial-attention/). On multitasking, see L. Mark Carriera, Larry D. 
Rosena, Nancy A. Cheever, and Alex F. Lim, “Causes, Effects, and Practicalities of Everyday Multitasking,” 
Developmental Review 35 (2015): 64–78. On hypernatural monitoring, see Samuel P.L. Veissière and Moriah 
Stendel, “Hypernatural Monitoring: A Social Rehearsal Account of Smartphone Addiction,” Frontiers in Psychology 
9, article 141 (2018): 1-10. 
4 Uma Narayan, “Minds Of Their Own: Choices, Autonomy, Cultural Practices and Other Women,” in L. Antony and 
C. Witt (eds.), A Mind of One’s Own. Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), 
418–432: 429. 
5 In this essay, I prefer to discuss social media participation generally, and I consider social networking site 
participation to be a subset of social media participation more widely. 
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threats of violence.6  I have participated in the literature over-focused on the harms to which no 
one would consent.7 My focus in this essay is different, but like those who have written on 
serious harms in cyberspace, I am concerned with the autonomy of social media participants. As 
Rebecca Kukla says, autonomy includes positive bodily agency and negative freedom from 
intrusion.8 It is widely recognized that negative freedom from intrusions such as shaming, 
harassment, stalking, and threats of violence are critical to autonomy, especially to mental health, 
senses of safety and actual safety, and social functionality. For my purposes, it is noteworthy that 
the goods of social media participation are also, increasingly and for many, critical to autonomy, 
including mental health and social functionality.  
It may, to the less-concerned, seem that the benefits of social media, if unimportant, are 
at least pleasant in the way that leisure is generally pleasant, and therefore all we need to do is 
recommend against harms to which no one could consent; assess shaming and harassing as 
wrong, and we’ve said all ethicists need to say. Yet as Kukla points out, consent is not enough 
for communications to go well.9 We can refrain from doxxing10 or threats of violence, but this 
does not necessarily result in healthy, flourishing users. It is better established in social sciences 
and technology studies that social media is important, in positive ways, to the flourishing of 
some users. Some interventions and self-regulatory practices may be permissive of social media 
                                                          
6 See, in addition to the sources in note 4, Emma A. Jane, “Flaming? What Flaming? The Pitfalls and Potentials of 
Researching Online Hostility,” Ethics and Information Technology 17 (2015):65-87; Majid Khosravinik & Eleonora 
Esposito, “Online Hate, Digital Discourse and Critique: Exploring Digitally-Mediated Discursive Practices of Gender-
Based Hostility,” Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 14 (2018):45-68; Nikil Mukerji, “What is Fake News?” Ergo: An Open 
Access Journal of Philosophy 5 (2018): 923-946; Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger, Re-Engineering Humanity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
7 [Footnote omitted for anonymity.] 
8 Rebecca Kukla, “That’s What She Said: The Language of Sexual Negotiation,” Ethics 129 (2018): 70–97. 
9 Ibid., 72.  
10 For a fuller understanding of doxing, see Shannon Vallor, “Social Networking and Ethics,” The Stanford 




participation that yields benefits to users without drawing us into some of its more diffuse 
drawbacks. The benefits for many can include emotional regulation, affective bonding, and 
improved access to information. For instance, in non-routine situations such as the aftermath of 
disasters, “social media have been found to provide psychological benefits for users: The more 
individuals actively engaged in social media communication, the more they benefitted 
emotionally in terms of feeling relieved and as a part of a like-minded community.”11 Of course, 
users in crisis are also able to get information and to communicate across distances when 
information and communications are otherwise frustrated.12 In nonemergency settings such as 
undergraduate universities, researchers found that students’ use of social media, especially when 
connecting to other on-campus students, facilitated adjustment to university and the development 
of friendships; they add that the social comparisons motivated by social network browsing are 
mistakenly assumed to be negative, yet especially when students are comparing their opinions 
and experiences rather than their abilities, social comparisons can have some positive effects on 
one’s self-understanding.13 Even cat-video sharing seems to provide some users, and not all 
users, with virtual pet-therapy benefits.14 In short, one cannot easily dismiss all social media as 
bad or beneath notice, given its benefits to multitudes across different situations, any more than 
one can safely assume social media is beneficial to everyone. 
 
II. Social media participation risks negatively formative experience 
                                                          
11 German Neubaum, Leonie Rösner, Astrid M. Rosenthal-von der Pütten, and Nicole C. Krämer, “Psychosocial 
functions of social media usage in a disaster situation: A multi-methodological approach,” Computers in Human 
Behavior 34 (2014), 28-38: 38. 
12 Ibid., 28. 
13 Chia-chen Yang and Angela Robinson, “Not Necessarily Detrimental: Two Social Comparison Orientations and 
Their Associations with Social Media Use and College Social Adjustment,” Computers in Human Behavior 84 (2018): 
49-57. 
14 Jessica Gall Myrick, “Emotion Regulation, Procrastination, and Watching Cat Videos Online: 
Who Watches Internet Cats, Why, and to What Effect?” Computers in Human Behavior 52 (2015): 168-176. 
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The above examples of ordinary benefits are foreseeable by would-be users, and one 
might argue that when one enters any SNS, one does so with reasonable expectations of the good 
effects of participation. Therefore, arguably we can be said to be acting intentionally and 
autonomously, in the sense that we consent in advance to the terms of use of social media, 
because we foresee pleasant benefits that we choose to pursue. However, I suggest that we may 
not be able to meaningfully consent in advance, if informed consent requires understanding the 
risks to our well-being inherent to social media.15 We cannot anticipate all the effects of abusive 
content online16, and the epistemic challenges to being truly informed about what online abuse is 
like are magnified by the efforts of social media platform designers to subvert our choice-making 
capacities to stop looking, once online.17  
I am especially interested in the risks we face as humans prone to negativity bias, that is, 
the selective attention of the brain to negative information and the capacity to remember one 
insult better than multiple compliments.18 Drawing on Paul’s account of transformative 
experience, I argue that we cannot know in advance what it is like to experience the types and 
                                                          
15 The answer to the article title turns out to be one in one thousand: Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, 
and David R. Trossen, “Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts,” The 
Journal of Legal Studies 43 (2014): 1-35. In this essay, I do not mean consent in the limited sense implied by online 
contracts; I am not saying simply that most of us who use Twitter neglect to read Twitter’s formal Terms of 
Agreement, although that is also true. 
16 I follow Nobata et al in referring to abusive content, which is not limited to harassment, profanity, or hate-
speech, although abusive content certainly includes all of those things; as I argue later, our negativity bias disposes 
us to retain and ruminate on passing abuses including mere insult in our direction, whether or not it is part of a 
pattern of harassment or rises to the level of hate speech; Chikashi Nobata, Joel Tetreault, Achint Thomas, Yashar 
Mehdad, and Yi Chang, "Abusive language detection in online user content," Proceedings of the 25th International 
Conference on World Wide Web, International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee (2016): 145-153. 
Accessed May 22, 2019: yichang-cs.com/yahoo/WWW16_Abusivedetection.pdf. 
17 I appreciate that nonsighted users also take in content from Twitter, but my concern in this paper is with users 
who are manipulated by the visual stimulations of notification icons and the color red, so throughout the paper I 
refer to ‘looking’ as well as ‘reading.’  
18 There are, as it turns out, multiple threats to individual and collective well-being posed by social media over-
participation, but in the scope of this essay, I focus on the negative mental burdens to which we are prone and that 
we cannot anticipate in their fullness. 
7 
 
amounts of anonymous insults or targeted hostilities and their effects that social media permits.19 
Research in psychology indicates that we also cannot know in advance if we are dispositionally 
more or less likely to find that the negativity to which we’re exposed has high, enduring impact 
or low, brief impact on our psyches, so social media negativity may also be a personally 
transformative experience.20 Even when experiences with abusive content online are not 
profoundly transformative (in the deep way that Paul describes childbearing as profoundly 
transformative), the experience may be formative of our identities in ways that permanently alter 
our attitudes toward ourselves and others in ways we would not have chosen; I refer to these as 
negatively formative experiences short of transformation. Such transformative experiences and 
negatively formative experiences are those we would not choose if we knew what they would be 
like. Therefore, even when we enter eagerly into social media for pleasant leisurely reasons, I 
argue that we cannot meaningfully consent in advance to the gambles that we take with our 
mental well-being. 
Consider that, according to one estimate, smartphone users each touch their phones 2,617 
times each day, on average; Apple recently confirmed that its device users unlock their phones 
80 times every day (5 times every waking hour on average).21 The variety of activity represented 
                                                          
19 Paul, Transformative Experience (2014). 
20 Pew Research Center analysts find that the impacts of online harassment, in particular, can be significant, but 
the duration of the effects is not predictable in advance and depends on a wide variety of factors including 
individuals’ social supports, genetics, dispositions, and well-being prior to harassment; Pew Research Center, 
“Online Harassment,” (2014, accessed May 15, 2019): http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/22/online-
harassment/. Clinician Samantha Silverberg notes that effects of online verbal abuse can include a decreased 
ability to concentrate, difficulty in making day-to-day decisions and increased levels of anxiety, to extents that “can 
drastically change how an individual engages,” although this, again, depends on the individual; it is moving, if 
unsettling, to read the Amnesty International research in which Silverberg appears, in which one social media user 
comments, “My friends have noticed a huge difference in me since;” see Amnesty International, “The 
Psychological Harms of Violence and Abuse Against Women Online,” Toxic Twitter (2018, accessed May 15, 2019): 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2018/03/online-violence-against-women-chapter-6/ . 
21 The first number appears in the widely discussed study by Dscout research; smartphone users were found to 
touch their phone an average of 2,617 times a day, and the heavy users did so more than 5,000 times a day. The 
full report is “Mobile Touches: dscout’s inaugural study on humans and their tech,” dscout, Inc. (2016), accessed 
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by these numbers includes social media engagement distributed by a single user to many. 
Smartphone users may scatter replies, comments, or judgments across more than one target and 
across more than one platform. But the same users are also the potential targets of the replies and 
judgments of fellow users, inundated with sensory and emotional inputs. One cannot know in 
advance when one will be the object of others’ online attentions. And once in our memories, the 
negativity bias, to which almost all humans are prone, will incline us to return to insults far more 
often than any compliment.22   
Those familiar with the Stroop effect, that is, our selective attention in the presence of 
conflicting cognitive stimuli, will understand that just as it is difficult to read a word for a color 
and perceive the ink’s different color with equal speed, it is also difficult for the brain to give 
insults and compliments equal weight.23 We are set up to be jarred by insults. This isn’t always 
bad, of course. One does not want to remember everything; it would be a huge cognitive load to 
no end. Instead, one remembers some things and not others. It is adaptive to do so. As a result, 
we are more inclined to process some information and hold on to it. Unfortuntely, once insults 
move in, they take up residence in our memories, and our memories are not under our controls. 
Would that they were.  
                                                          
May 15, 2019, https://pages.dscout.com/mobile-touches-download-form. Apple user-frequency was separately 
studied by Apple and statistics shared at a widely reported company briefing; see for an example of such reportage 
Mikey Campbell, “Average iPhone user unlocks device 80 times per day, 89% use Touch ID, Apple says,” 
appleinsider.com (Monday, April 18, 2016, accessed May 15, 2019), 
https://appleinsider.com/articles/16/04/19/average-iphone-user-unlocks-device-80-times-per-day-89-use-touch-
id-apple-says. 
22 The human propensity for negative attention bias, or negativity bias, is described as demonstrated via Stroop 
test by many authors, including the widely cited work by Roy F., Baumeister, Ellen Bratslavsky, Catrin Finkenauer, 
and Kathleen D. Vohs, "Bad is stronger than good," Review of General Psychology 5 (2001): 323-370. 
23 Colin MacLeod’s overview of the Stroop test and related literature is a helpful overview for understanding J.R. 
Stroop’s original experiments and influence; Colin M. MacLeod, "Half a century of research on the Stroop effect: an 
integrative review," Psychological bulletin 109 (1991): 163. 
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Note that I am not describing the occupation of one’s minds by insults as a risk on the 
part of social media “addicts.” One need not be addicted to anything to be subject to the Stroop 
effect, merely habituated to reading.24 And users of social media are habituated to reading.  
 The mental occupation I describe may not always be deeply transformative, but I hope it 
is clear why I hold that negatively formative experiences with abusive content bear some relation 
to what Paul describes as a transformative experience, insofar as it is not possible to rationally 
predict whether one will prefer to be so mentally rearranged. For Paul, experiences are 
transformative when their consequences for one’s life or identity are profound in some way, and 
when those of us who have not yet had the experience cannot fully appreciate what is rational for 
the transformed agent, given changes to desires and deliberations that are results of the 
experience one can only know post-transformation.25 Not all social media users find that the 
effects on one’s mental states are enduring or profound, and the impact can vary with known and 
unknown qualities of individual minds. That very unpredictability of effect suggests that the 
Stroop effect of online abuse is related to Paul’s saying, regarding epistemic transformative 
experiences, “In this sort of situation, you know very little about your possible future... And so, if 
you want to make the decision by thinking about what your lived experience would be like if you 
decided to undergo the experience, you have a problem. In such a situation, you find yourself 
facing a decision where you lack the information you need to make the decision the way you 
naturally want to make it—by assessing what the different possibilities would be like and 
choosing between them.”26 I extend Paul’s insight into situations in which one knows that one’s 
                                                          
24 This is why experimental subjects in Stroop-style tests shown the word for one color in the tint of another color 
will find it easier to say the word rather than the tint; reading is an effortless habit in the presence of a mentally 
effortful conflict. The Stroop test demonstrates the increase in cognitive load and subsequently delayed response 
that results from attentional conflict. 
25 Paul, Transformative Experience. 
26 Ibid., 2-3. 
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choices can incur personally altering effects, in order to argue that even when one does not know 
that entering into social media takes the risk of epistemically transformative experiences, 
encounters with unpredictable insult or verbal abuse also may turn out to be personally 
transformative or at least negative and formative in ways one would not have chosen. 
Paul says, regarding personally transformative experiences, that they relate to 
experiences that effect changes in who one takes oneself to be, post-transformation; again, one 
cannot know in advance of the experience how it will fundamentally change one’s point of view 
or the value-laden preferences that previously constituted one’s view of one’s character.27 She 
adds that experiences may be epistemically transformative, personally transformative, or both. I 
extend her view to less transformative, but formative, experiences, because we cannot know 
what it feels like in advance to receive online abuse and we cannot know if it will live in our 
memories. Typical human disposition to negativity bias entails that most of us take a risk with 
our mental well-being, or at least our emotional attention, when we participate in a world wide 
web of unpredictable users of words. It is only a risk; the formative experience of online abuse is 
not inevitably personally transformative. I have witnessed some social media users frankly 
marvel at reception of abusive content on the very platforms on which they experience it, without 
reporting any permanent alterations in their core preferences, values, or self-conceptions. 
However, some users indeed report actual changes to their personality over time as a result of 
online abuse, especially as they come to realize how they are perceived from the perspectives of 
their insulters, that is, their imagined audience.28  
                                                          
27 Paul, Transformative Experience, 16. 




Regardless of our knowledge in advance, or a formal set of conditions of agreement, no 
one can meaningfully consent in advance to harmful content online, because the experience of 
encountering abusive speech is unpredictable and the duration of its impact is only discoverable 
through experience.29 Experiences such as these undermine our autonomy when they alter our 
self-conceptions for the worse and our abilities to communicate with others.   
 
III. Continuous partial attention and dependence upon ludic loops of reward 
Although the philosophical literature on consent in social media is still young, the 
software engineers of social media have raised articulate alarms regarding their own creations. 
For example, Justin Rosenstein compares SnapChat to “heroin” and compares Facebook ‘likes’ 
to “bright dings of pseudo-pleasure” that can be “as hollow as they are seductive;” journalist 
Paul Lewis adds that “Rosenstein should know: he was the Facebook engineer who created the 
‘like’ button in the first place.”30 (Around the same time that Rosenstein did so, Lewis adds, 
Facebook developers also changed the notification symbol from blue to red; they found that 
changing it to red resulted in far more engagement, as the alarming color triggered most users’ 
senses of urgency and reward.) Tristan Harris, a Google product manager, shares worries similar 
to Rosenstein’s: “All of our minds can be hijacked.…Our choices are not as free as we think they 
                                                          
29 In discussion of a previous version of this paper, an audience member noted that one can also have the 
experience of witnessing the distress of friends and family with whom one identifies or empathizes. I agree that 
this is an experience which can inform one’s preferences and choices of conduct. I cannot agree that it is 
qualitatively the same as experiencing it oneself, which influences one’s basic preferences and perceptions as to 
who one is in the social realm. Lamenting the experiences of others does not amount to the sort of formative 
experience that I have attempted to convey in this essay. 
30 Rosenstein is quoted by Paul Lewis; see Lewis, “‘Our minds can be hijacked’: the tech insiders who fear a 




are.”31 Harris provides the interviewer with the comparison of social media users to gamblers, 
specifically with respect to the ludic loops incurred by the “pull-to-refresh” mechanism: 
 
The most seductive design, Harris explains, exploits the same psychological susceptibility that makes 
gambling so compulsive: variable rewards. When we tap those apps with red icons, we don’t know whether 
we’ll discover an interesting email, an avalanche of “likes”, or nothing at all.  
 
It is the possibility of disappointment that makes it so compulsive. 
 
It’s this that explains how the pull-to-refresh mechanism, whereby users swipe down, pause and wait to see 
what content appears, rapidly became one of the most addictive and ubiquitous design features in modern 
technology. “Each time you’re swiping down, it’s like a slot machine,” Harris says. “You don’t know 
what’s coming next.”32 
 
Rosenstein and Harris are describing the state of users already active on social media. I 
add to their observations that our initial entry into social media is like entry into a casino, 
voluntary in some ways, even if manipulatively rehabituated as they describe.33 One may seek 
out company voluntarily; the prosocial desires that inform the choice to enter social media are 
fundamental and include urges to be recognized by others, but there are a multiplicity of ways to 
                                                          
31 Quoted in Lewis, “‘Our minds can be hijacked’: the tech insiders who fear a smartphone dystopia,” The 
Guardian. 
32 Ibid. 
33 I am further influenced by the work of Natasha Dow Schull, an expert in scholarship of casino gambling who has 
turned her attention to online gambling, but I extend her comparisons to consideration of other forms of mobile 
information technology usage, more broadly conceived; see Natasha Dow Schull, "Digital Gambling: The 
Coincidence of Desire and Design," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 597.1 
(2005): 65-81. Veissière and Stendel relatedly point out that “there is nothing inherently addictive about mobile 
technology,” and it is rather the expectations of social rewards that moves people to become addicted via usage; 
Samuel P.L. Veissière and Moriah Stendel, “Hypernatural Monitoring: A Social Rehearsal Account of Smartphone 
Addiction,” Frontiers in Psychology 9, article 141 (2018): 1-10. 
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satisfy those urges and firing up an app is only one of them. Decision-capable adults have the 
competence to consent. The problem is that, although users may be competent to click the button 
that accepts the terms and conditions of Twitter insofar as we have the requisite capacities to 
consent and the available option to choose not to enter, in the course of using the platform our 
capacities become undermined by engineered ludic loops so that we do not always retain 
competence to consent in the course of performing participation.34  
We are not as free to leave as we are to enter, because the variable rewards are constantly 
flowing to us in ways that alter some of the mental states that affect the very conditions for 
decision-capable consent. More than nudges, which may manipulate preferences temporarily, the 
ludic loops of social media platforms are designed to be mood-altering and to have a high or 
constant event-frequency.35 Moreover, once we are habituated to expect and anticipate ludic 
loops of variable reward, re-entry into social media on future occasions seems less transparently 
consensual than they may have been at first. One need not go so far as to agree that social media 
is addictive, if it is sufficiently problematic for consent that our ability to form and know our 
preferences is altered by those who engineer social media to degrade our attention spans and 
motivate our preference for the sorts of ludic loops that social media provides.   
There is a growing literature arguing that social media users demonstrate behavioral 
addiction, but even physiological addicts have autonomy in a general sense. As Neil Levy 
argues, “At worst, addicts are subject to impairments of autonomy” at times when “they 
                                                          
34 I take the distinction between (advance) competence (in the sense of capacity to consent) and (use-)competence 
(in the course of performing that to which one consented) from Gita Cale, although I do so in a way very differently 
than the author intended; see Gita S. Cale, “Continuing the debate over risk-related standards of 
competence,” Bioethics 13.2 (1999):131–148.  
35 Schull notes that “event frequency is correlated with development of any addiction” (Natasha Dow Schull, 
“Digital Gambling: The Coincidence of Desire and Design,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 597.1 (2005): 322n72). 
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encounter cues that trigger their cravings,” but “for the great majority of the time… addicts are 
as autonomous as you and me” to an extent that preserves their capacities for informed consent.36 
To retain that consent-enabling autonomy, Levy points out, an addict or anyone without 
addiction but with a “persistent desire” need simply turn attention away from the cues that 
trigger desires. Levy adds, “Addicts find this technique difficult to employ, since the cues that 
trigger their cravings tend to capture their attention. However, they can take steps to avoid 
encountering the cues in the first place.”37 He suggests that avoiding the cues may involve 
avoiding the contexts that one associates with the persistent desire or addiction.  
This is good news for those of us who can arrange our lives to avoid contexts we 
associate with some kinds of persistent desire. Unfortunately for social media users accustomed 
to ludic loops of reward, the triggering contexts associated with reward are those of starting up 
the computer and using one’s smartphone. Depending on one’s job, one’s responsibilities for 
family and childcare, and one’s alternatives for sources of information, these contexts can be 
extremely difficult to arrange one’s life to avoid. In this essay I aim to attend to social media use 
in particular and not conflate the use of social media with the use of smartphones and computers 
generally, but here the relationship between them is important; to the extent that many of us have 
become dependent upon computers and smartphones, we have become subject to ego-depleting 
triggers to open a new tab in a browser, or tap a social media app on the phone.38 For most 
readers of this essay, the very screen on which one reads this paper is a context that provides 
                                                          
36 Neil Levy, “Addiction, Autonomy and Ego-Depletion: A Response to Bennett Foddy and Julian Savulescu,” 
Bioethics 20.1 (2006), 16–20: 20. 
37 Ibid. 
38 See Levy, “Addiction, Autonomy and Ego-Depletion,” 19, regarding ego-depletion, that is, the effect of 
diminished self-control due to exertion of self-control over time; Levy describes self-control as a limited resource 
and analogizes self-control with muscles that, after exertions, become subsequently harder to call upon. It is out of 
the scope of this short paper to address the mounting literature suggesting that Smartphone users are addicted to 
their phones, so I content myself with noting that it is no longer really a debate as to whether smartphone users 
have a widespread level of problematic use.   
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ego-depleting triggers, and it may likely be the case that just since beginning to read this essay, 
one has also checked one’s email or messages and opened at least one tab on a computer 
browser, whether one wanted to or not; perhaps one did not realize until now that one had done 
so at all. 
 
IV. Social Media Participation does not indicate implicit consent 
Of course, perhaps one wants to return to social media. If people are just trying to have 
fun or avoid looking at each other at the bus stop, if the risks of harm are low for most, then 
perhaps participants in social media do not care that we give over “forced consent,” that is, 
consent bundled with access39, to social media platforms. One may even argue that participants 
in social media could be said to implicitly consent to will-undermining practices of social media; 
our very participation in such activities as Twitter and Facebook, in conjunction with our broader 
knowledge of the nature of online communication, might indicate we are all performing acts of 
implicit consent in using social media platforms. More than one philosopher has suggested that 
criticism and even insult is to be expected online and we all know what we’re getting into, and 
should simply be (better educated or very resigned) adults. My response is based on our limited 
freedom to change our contexts or leave social media.  
As Nicolás Maloberti says of political consent, “for an act of consent to count as such, 
there must be something that is possible to do which counts as refusing to consent.40 While it is 
                                                          
39 The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into effect in Europe at the end of May 2018, legislation 
that immediately permitted groups to file complaints in courts arguing against Facebook, Google, and Twitter for 
practices of “forced consent,” on the grounds that bundling consent with access and stipulating that access 
requires consent violates the GDPR. See the most well-known complaint at the following URL: https://noyb.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/ pa_forcedconsent_en.pdf. 
40 Nicolás Maloberti, “The Fallacy of Consent,” Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (2010), 469-476: 472. My appeal to 
Maloberti’s argument is motivated by my researching the recent lawsuits against “forced consent” in cyberspace 
on the same day that I read Maloberti’s rejection of implicit consent to political authority, on very similar lines; a 
notion of implicit consent via participation would seem to require an alternative freedom to refuse to consent. I 
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true that one could refuse to participate in social media, it also seems to be the case that leaving 
social media has costs for some more than others, to such an extent that a blanket 
recommendation to refuse to participate is not practical or supportive of one’s autonomy in other 
ways. Malobarti similarly notes that of course leaving a state is possible, but for some more 
costly than others; he cites David Hume, who “questioned how realistic it is to consider the 
option to emigrate as an available alternative for individuals to whom the prospects of emigrating 
would be clearly undesirable.”41 In addition to my concern given the evidence that our wills are 
undermined with respect to freely considering emigration from social media, I share a worry 
analogous to Hume’s and Malobarti’s. I do not believe that everyone equally enjoys the absence 
of cost if they leave social media. My costs, for example, would be low; I am an established, 
tenured professor who will never need to look for a job again and cannot be fired without cause, 
as well as blessed with a partner and a large extended family. Those who are still struggling, still 
networking, or socially isolated cannot leave social media as easily as I can. So the acts we tend 
to think of as counting as refusing to consent to social media, such as deleting accounts from 
SNS or taking a holiday from the Internet, are not equally available to all; uneven options to 
leave do not seem sufficient to Maloberti’s ethical demand that for an act of consent to count as 
such, there must be something that is possible to do which counts as refusing to consent. 
Further, implicit consent relies on assumptions that the activity permitting the inference 
of explicit consent is voluntary; Maloberti offers the example of one who goes to a restaurant and 
orders a meal as implicitly consenting to the expectation that he pay for it.42 The customer need 
not go with the intention of ordering food in order to spend money; his intention may only be to 
                                                          
realize that this essay has mixed informed consent in bioethics with consent to be governed in political theory, and 
I do so with apologies for the necessity of their admixture in ways the authors did not intend. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Maloberti, “The Fallacy of Consent,” 470. 
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satisfy a yen for lasagna. But we can fairly hold the customer to make the choice to go the 
restaurant and place the order by choice. I am suggesting in this essay that many individuals’ 
participation in social media cannot be described the same way. If I have been persuasive, then it 
should be clear that social media cultivates our thoughtlessness, and successfully so. The will to 
enter social media may be sincere, and motivated by reasons both affective and considered, but 
the habituation of persons to turn to social media before they even realize that they have done so 
gives us reason to think that the impulsive reaction to a Facebook post is not the same as 
choosing to go to a restaurant.  
I noted earlier that, as Natasha Dow Schull says, event frequency correlates with 
addiction. I hope I have shown that social media participation provides the possibilities for 
indefinite event frequency on a platform so proximate that it is difficult to track. If implicit 
consent to social media entails voluntarily choosing to engage, then we are not even implicitly 
consenting to participate so frequently. If we cannot even be said to implicitly consent to our 
continual returns to ludic loops of reward, then social media undermines our autonomy. 
 
V. Conclusion: Toward a More Successful Sociality  
My focus in this essay has been on the disvalue of social media for the autonomy of 
individuals. Yet I noted in my introduction that social media can also have benefits to 
individuals, including emotional benefits such as relief and sense of belonging in a like-minded 
community, epistemic benefits such as self-understanding and communication across distances 
in rapid time, especially during crises, relational benefits including facilitated adjustment to 
university and the development of friendships, and even virtual pet-therapy. A social media 
participant to whom benefits accrue is enjoying the fruits of sociality, and could even be said to 
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be flourishing precisely because of participation in social media. Feminist philosophers have 
argued compellingly that relationships enable autonomy, and their insights tell against 
confidentally recommending against participation in social media for all.43 Further, although one 
who uses social media heavily may have her autonomy undermined in some respects, this does 
not entail that she lacks agency or an authentic self-concept. One’s inner freedom is not identical 
with one’s capacity for agency.44 And as Diana Meyers argues, autonomy admits of degrees; in 
the non-ideal reality of particular social contexts, one’s self-realization does not entail that 
agent’s being able to realize all her capacities and potentials, and it may be sufficient to develop 
those that are critical to the agent’s authentic self-concept in the course of the agent’s life-plan.45 
Even if one’s behaviors on social media platforms are not, properly speaking, one’s own, 
it is arguable that one is autonomous enough in the ways one cares about; one’s identity is of 
one’s own making, intact enough that one can afford to yield swaths of preference-development 
over to the influences of social network software developers. On individual bases, then, each 
social media participant might be held to expectations of self-regulation with respect to her social 
media use, and even when that use is heavy and undermines that individual’s autonomy in some 
respects, it does not necessarily lead to being a less autonomous individual in key respects.  
This seems partially correct. One could have negative and formative experiences with 
abusive content that change one’s personality and major communication choices, one could have 
habituated and excessive use-patterns on social media that one does not even want, and yet one 
                                                          
43 Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities,” Yale Journal of Law and 
Feminism, 1 (1989): 7–36; see also Natalie Stoljar, "Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy," The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2018 Edition), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/feminism-autonomy/ . 
44 Michael Garnett, “Agency and Inner Freedom,” Noûs 51 (2017): 3-23. 
45 Diana Tietjens Meyers, “Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self? Opposites Attract!”, in Relational 
Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie 
Stoljar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000): 151-180. 
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could still respond affirmatively to the question as to whether one is authentically following 
one’s life plan and sufficiently free to be oneself. And one may always be so free. I am 
persuaded by Meyers that everyone’s autonomy is conditioned by context and relational. Yet two 
worries remain.  
The first is easy to state briefly, as it is a recapitulation of much of this essay. If an agent 
is habituated to ludic loops of reward, changed by negatively formative experiences, or both, in 
other words if an agent’s will is already undermined, and if the ego-depleting contexts in which 
one operates are unavoidable, then how does an agent know that they are pursuing the life plan 
and freely being the self they want to be? Epistemic obstacles seem built into the project of self-
assessment for users of social media, precisely because of the external and engineered 
mechanisms that give rise to their motivations to continue scrolling. 
My second worry is practical and normative rather than epistemic, and suggests 
directions for ethical prescriptions: Does the existence of an individual whose autonomy is not 
unduly undermined by social media tell against the argument that social media has disvalue to 
the extent that it undermines autonomy generally? I suggest the autonomous-enough individual 
who is happy to be somewhat reliant on social media does not problematize my view of the 
disvalue of social media for autonomy generally, because an autonomous-enough personal life 
does not rise to the level of what Lisa Tessman describes as successful sociality. Tessman argues 
that enjoying some of the benefits of sociality may not translate into flourishing, especially if 
one’s own individual enjoyments of some social goods are compatible with, and even come at 
the cost of, the reduction in flourishing of others.46 Further, some enjoyments of sociality are not 
necessarily conducive to one’s own flourishing, or the flourishing of the communities to which 
                                                          




one belongs. Tessman’s perspective that successful sociality is more desirable, and more 
conducive to robustly autonomous flourishing, than exclusionary or self-absorbed well-being is 
apt to apply to social media participation. One individual may find it enjoyable or diverting to 
participate in Twitter at the expense of the well-being of others, to an extent that makes whole 
communities worse off. If Meyers and others are correct that autonomy is relational, then the 
worsening of the communities that enable communication and agency is undermining of 
autonomy even for sufficiently contented agents.  
For the sake of autonomous-enough, happy social media users as well as the sakes of 
their complex communities, I am interested in connecting Tessman’s account of successful 
sociality to Levy’s observations that addicts or anyone with a “persistent desire” could turn 
attention away from the cues that trigger desires, and take steps to avoid encountering the cues in 
the first place, by avoiding the contexts in which the cues occur. The happy, autonomous-enough 
social media user may be autonomous in part because of relationships that sustain, affirm, and 
encourage the happy user. Yet it is not possible to know with great certainty that all of one’s own 
supportive relata are equally autonomous-enough in the presence of ubiquitous ego-depleting 
triggers to take part in social media.  
Therefore, instead of relying on individual self-regulation or individual self-knowledge of 
one’s preferences and choices, agents have good reason to engage in cooperative, relational 
practices of helping each other to regulate participation in social media and develop better 
awareness of each other’s usage. This could take the form of explicit commitment in public 
discourse to be communities in which members are encouraged by each other to rotate efforts, 
reduce individuals’ participation, and take turns and breaks from social media with the full 
support of members of social networks. In popular press and common discourse, solutions to the 
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problem of social media overuse and abuse tend either to what the social media platforms ought 
to do at design and engineering levels, or to what individual users ought to do at personal and 
ethical levels. I think both sorts of recommendations are quite correct, but I do not harbor great 
hopes that design-level changes will happen, and I am concerned that individual breaks and fasts 
from social media are conceptualized in overly isolated ways. So I end this essay with 
encouragement of readers to appreciate that we are not always our own best judges of our 
reasons for action, especially when our actions are those of participants in an online platform 
built to elicit more of our participation. We are not all equally free, nor will we always be if I am 
right that participation in indefinitely large communities online risks negatively formative and 
even transformative experiences. To the extent that autonomy is relational, social media users 
who value their own autonomy and the autonomy of others are, and should be, each other’s allies 
in cooperative risk management. 
 
